ABSTRACT DNS DDoS attacks may severely affect the operation of computer networks, prompting the need for methods able to timely detect them, and then to apply mitigation countermeasures. Visual models have been used to detect an ongoing DDoS attack, but often demand continuous attention from IT staff. However, machine learning techniques could complement a visual model with further information and with on-time alerts that could help IT officers give attention only when an attack is in progress at its very early stage. In this paper, we present DNS-ADVP, a DNS Anomaly Detection Visual Platform, which, in an integrated manner, provides a novel visualisation that depicts on-line DNS traffic, and a one-class classifier that deals with traffic anomaly detection. Using the visual mode, an IT officer may interpret the current state of traffic for an authoritative DNS server; the model comes with visual semaphores, controlled by the one-class classifier. Due to the highly dynamic nature of DNS traffic, our classification method continuously updates what counts as normal behaviour; it has been successfully tested on synthetic attacks, with an 83% of the area under the curve (AUC). DNS-ADVP is currently in use to real-time monitoring an actual authoritative DNS server.
I. INTRODUCTION
DDos attacks are a matter of concern for IT staff around the world since they severely affect the normal operation of networks, especially the operation of the DNS service. Due to the disruptive effects of DDoS attacks, implementing efficient countermeasures that can timely detect and then mitigate them, particularly those targeting authoritative DNS servers, becomes paramount. One of the most popular DDoS attacks targeting DNS servers is DNS amplification. The main goal of an amplification attack is to exhaust a victim's bandwidth, and in a lesser degree, her CPU or memory.
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In general, the amplification effect may be achieved in either of two ways: the number of messages or the size of messages. The DNS amplification follows the latter approach; thus, the attacker spoofs a target's IP and sends out a small DNS request with the aim of making that IP the recipient of much larger responses [1] - [4] . DNS amplification attacks are asymmetric [4] in that they are more harmful by using fewer computational resources in comparison to other kinds of attacks. That means that amplification attacks have a greater impact and do so at a global scale; see for example, the dafa888.wf attack [5] .
In October 2016, a large scale DDoS attack occurred against the servers of Dyn affecting sites such as CNN, Twitter, and Netflix [6] . The attack was performed by a network of IoT devices known as the Mirai botnet. These sort of events clearly make pressure on ICT officers to implement new and more efficient techniques to protect their IT infrastructure. Detecting and preventing DDoS attacks is an ongoing research topic. A current approach for DDoS attacks detection is by means of visualisation techniques [7] , [8] ; however, the main drawback is that visualisation could be overwhelming for administrators. However, machine learning techniques could complement visualisations providing further information and alerts that could ease the visual inspections whenever an undergoing attack is in place. This is exactly the approach we undertook to develop a visual platform to monitor DNS traffic and alert whenever an anomaly is detected. We named the platform DNS-ADVP, which stands for DNS Anomaly Detection Visual Platform, and it is described in detail in the following sections.
This work was performed in collaboration with the Mexican Network Information Center (NIC-Mexico). NIC-Mexico has the responsibility to administer the internet domain names with the MX suffixes, and it is also in charge of assigning Internet resources in Mexico. In this work, we analyse the effectiveness of some techniques used to limit the effects of DDoS attacks targeting DNS servers and also propose a set of measures to timely detect potential DDoS attacks against this service, such as amplification, and reflection attacks, among others. By means of these countermeasures, we built DNS-ADVP, whose main components are a visual model that depicts on-line DNS traffic and a one-class classifier. The visual model can alert whenever unusual DNS traffic is seen, and it is supported by the output of the classifier, which discriminates normal from abnormal traffic. This novel platform is currently monitoring in real time DNS input/output traffic of an authoritative DNS server. Although this is a validation phase in order to guarantee that the software is stable and error-free, it is planned to run on several authoritative servers that provide the DNS service. Our main contributions in this study are: 1) We carried out a deep analysis of well-known techniques to mitigate DNS DDoS attacks, specifying their relevance and feasibility of adoption in a production environment. 2) We derived a richer feature vector than the one presented in [9] which we believe captures the behaviour of DNS traffic. This 45-dimension feature vector could serve as the bases for further research, for example, to compare another family of machine learning algorithms. 3) We proposed a novel visual model to graphically interpret the state of the DNS traffic and to point out any anomalies using visual semaphores. A very interesting approach is proposed in [8] but with a different aim, which is the detection of botnet behaviour. Their model maps DNS requests to a cylindrical coordinate system in order to visualise behavioural patterns that correspond to bot activity. To our knowledge, there are no visual models reported in the literature that resemble the one proposed in this study. 4) We developed a new classifier based on K-NN, ad hoc to the dynamic nature of authoritative DNS traffic.
In our experiments, our classifier achieved an 83% of the area under the curve (AUC) when tested on synthetic attacks. By analysing DNS traffic, we found that the traffic of a day is different from that of any other day. In this context, a classifier that continuously updates its knowledge is necessary. The challenge is finding and keeping track of the ''stable behaviour'' of the DNS traffic over time. In this work, we performed a classification experiment that allowed us to identify such a stable behaviour that we used as the basis to design and create a classifier capable of detecting abnormal conditions. 5) Our last contribution regards the integration and fusion of the two previous information sources, that is the classifier output and the visual model, into a graphical platform to monitor authoritative DNS traffic in real-time with the aim of timely detecting DDoS attacks.
This document is organised as follows: Section II reviews some techniques that have been widely used to mitigate amplification attacks and related work that is close to ours. Section III describes the pre-processing steps performed on the binary data logs containing DNS traffic required for further processing. An added output is a set of basic statistics that describe the nature and volume of DNS traffic. Next, in Section IV we present the results of the analysis performed on known techniques to mitigate DNS DDoS attacks, pointing out their relevance and feasibility of implementation in a production environment. Sections V and VI are the core of this work where we introduce respectively our visual model and the machine learning algorithm, which are the main components of the visual platform. In Section VII, we present the architecture of DNS-ADVP, as the result of the integration of the visual model and the classifier. Finally, in Section VIII, we give our conclusions and a brief discussion on future lines of research.
II. RELATED WORK
An efficient mechanism to mitigate DNS amplification or reflection attacks, is RRL (Response Rate Limiting), considered an improvement to the DNS protocol [10] , [11] . DNS RRL works by restraining the number of similar responses that can be returned by a DNS server to a group of clients within a given time interval. Given how RRL works it is well suited to mitigate common amplification attacks. However, it suffices for an attacker to spoof a variety of IPs in order to bypass the RRL rules, thus overwhelming bandwidth, memory and CPU resources on the target DNS server. The attacker may use thousands or more different IPs to accomplish this.
According to [12] , methods for DDoS attack detection are usually based on measuring traffic volume; however, these methods are not always effective since some DDoS attacks only look to degrade the quality of service of a network. In order to characterise and detect DDoS attacks, they propose the use of machine learning techniques along with entropy-based features, since these features measure information uncertainties and thus can show changes in traffic patterns. This work is related to [13] where the authors claim that the accuracy and reliability of anomaly-based network intrusion detection systems depend on the quality of the data used to build normal behaviour profiles; thus, the authors use entropy measurements and machine learning techniques such as clustering and classification in order sanitise network logs to improve the quality of these profiles.
Besides the previous work, there are some automatic detection approaches designed with the DNS protocol in mind; for example, Kambourakis et al. [14] and Di Paola and Lombardo [15] present experimental approaches to mitigate DNS amplification attacks. The proposal in [14] is built on a one-to-one mapping of DNS requests and responses. Thus, whenever a DNS amplification attack takes place, the target receives responses without having previously sent out the matching request. The authors called these responses orphan pairs, which are discarded and classified as suspicious. The work in [15] is in essence very similar to that of [14] and their main improvement is the way in which the authors handle the one-to-one mapping using Bloom filters that make the approach more efficient. Notice that neither approach is considered in RRL; we believe that if adapted to work with authoritative DNS servers, they could lead to a more powerful and robust mechanism against amplification attacks. RRL is currently implemented in BIND 9 1 , and its deployment is becoming more common.
Additionally, the work by Seo et al. in [8] and by Alonso et al. [9] present novel approaches to detect attacks to the DNS service. The former proposes a visualisation tool that is capable of detecting botnet behaviour based on DNS requests. The authors map requests to DNS servers to a cylindrical coordinate system in order to easily visualise behavioural patterns that correspond to bot activity. The latter relies on the observation that DNS usage gives rise to social structures; the authors build these structures by mining the interactions of IP addresses to domain names, or vice versa. Thus, a DNS amplification attack would dramatically increase the number of domains being referred to in a time period which, in turn, leads to a drastic change in the DNS social structures.
Host-based intrusion detection systems are an essential component of cybersecurity [16] , [17] ; however, our work is confined to the area of network-based detection systems, since our model is based only on network packets before they reach the authoritative DNS server.
III. DATA PRE-PROCESSING
The first step towards our visual platform, involves a data preprocessing phase. This step was helpful in getting acquainted 1 Internet Systems Consortium's official site: https://www.isc.org/bind/ to the nature and volume of traffic we would be dealing with. For this step and all subsequent experiments, we worked with data logs corresponding to different days and hours of normal authoritative DNS traffic. The first batch of data logs were binary files of approximately 14 GB in size, corresponding to 2 hours of captured traffic.
As a first step, we decided to use tshark [18] to transform each binary log into a plain-text file. We selected tshark and its related tools since they provide a way to interact via the command line which makes it easy to integrate with other scripts, applications and programs. Each plain-text file contains, just as the binary file, information regarding each packet, such as its size, a timestamp, the source/destination IP and MAC addresses, used ports, protocols, DNS queries, and so on. An example of the output is shown in Fig. 1 , where due to privacy assurance, IP and MAC addresses have been anonymised.
The previous transformation from binary to plain text incurs in a huge increment in size (from 14 GB to 147 GB) and information redundancy. Therefore, in order to get rid of this redundancy, a second pre-processing step consists in the use of the Unix command sed [19] , which allows automatic edition of the text using regular expressions and requires small computational resources.
The third and final pre-processing step gives a structured format to the data and removal of useless information. We use a python script of our own to perform this task. Fig. 2 shows a sample of the final output, a format ready to be interpreted and processed. It can be noticed only one header followed by a sequence of records, in this case only the first record is shown. Likewise, IP and MAC addresses have also been anonymised, as well as domain names. By means of this procedure, the logs are cleaned, formatted, and downsized to 40 GB. Additionally, we used a set of scripts (available at http://www.github.com/vferman) to compute basic statistics, like the ones described in the next section.
A. BASIC DNS AND OTHER TRAFFIC STATISTICS
As a result of the pre-processing step, we have obtained basic descriptive statistics about the DNS traffic, using several FIGURE 2. Example of the final log showing one header followed by a sequence of records (only the first one is displayed).
FIGURE 3.
Input/output packet rate at the DNS server. Note that there are some valleys in the graph since original logs are cut at given sizes and not at given time intervals.
window sizes. We consider relevant to be familiar with the sort of input/output traffic that reaches authoritative servers; we found out that:
• The input/output traffic at the target server is about 20 million packets per hour, that corresponds to approximately 5,500 packets per second, as shown in Fig. 3 .
• Approximately 90% of the traffic uses UDP, although TCP may be used to perform DNS queries.
• Approximately 83% is IPv4 traffic and about 17% IPv6.
• Regarding the 83% of IPv4 traffic, about 78% coveys DNS packets, while the other 5% corresponds to other protocols such as ICMP and HTTP.
• From the DNS protocol, several types of RR (Resource Records) are used, being the most commons: OPT (Option), NS (Authoritative Name Server), and A (Host Address).
• The number of unique IP addresses in 1 hour is approximately 200,000; on average each IP generates 100 packets during this time frame.
• A window of 1 second of traffic, contains approximately 800 unique IPs and about the same amount of unique domain names.
• The average amplification factor is 4.8.
IV. EXPLORING KNOWN TECHNIQUES TO MITIGATE DNS DDOS ATTACKS
In order to perform an amplification or a reflection attack, the attacker usually identifies a set of resolvers that may be used to send back responses to the victims. Then the attacker sends UDP-DNS requests from one or more computers (usually a botnet) that use as its origin IP the one of the victim. Then the reflecting servers process the recursive queries and send the response back to the victim. From the victims' perspective, the effect is being flooded by a massive amount of non-requested DNS responses coming from a multitude of servers (the reflectors) which makes it difficult to mitigate since it would require blocking each of these servers one by one. Moreover, tracking the attacker is complicated since IPs are being spoofed and the size of the responses may be much larger than the size of the queries depending on the amplification factor (for instance, if a request has a size of 70 bytes, the response may have a size of 3 KB or more and so, the amplification factor could be 48 or higher in some cases).
As we have said, as a side contribution of this paper, we explored already well-known techniques that have proved efficient when protecting DNS infrastructure against DDoS attacks, such as amplification or reflection attacks. We tested on the DNS data logs the following techniques: a UDP rule to limit the rate of requests done by the same IP [20] , the well-known RRL (Response Rate Limit) [11] , and the work proposed by Kambourakis et al. [14] .
We implemented these techniques and simulated their effect on one-hour data logs of DNS traffic, in order not to disrupt the servers' normal operation. We assessed the main advantages and disadvantages of these techniques, their relevance, and feasibility to implement them in a production environment. We present in the following sections the results and conclusions of this analysis.
A. REQUEST LIMIT PER IP
Schoonbrood in [20] suggests that the amount of requests an IP performs, n, should be limited to five requests per second; however, given the nature of the traffic on authoritative servers, this limit is too small and blocks about 50% of traffic which most probably corresponds to legitimate traffic. Thus, we proceeded to adjust n and run experiments with the following number of requests as the limit: n = 10, 50, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800. The results are shown in Table 1 . When the value of n is between 10 and 100, it is very likely to eliminate legitimate traffic. When n = 100, 10.5% of traffic is discarded and we observe 23 persistent IPs, that is, IPs that comply with the UDP rule. However, for n = 200 the number of persistent IPs is 10, the discarded traffic is 8.15%, and the possibility for this traffic to be invalid increases. Taking into account the volume of traffic we are dealing with (200 K of unique IPs), we believe, and thus recommend, that the rule can be safety implemented using a value of n = 200 as the maximum number of requests a single IP makes per second. The administrator can then manually allow or block the persistent IPs once confirmed, by using whois or another tool, if they correspond to legitimate or non-legitimate users.
B. RRL (RESPONSE RATE LIMIT)
The next technique we evaluated is RRL (Response Rate Limit) [11] , recommended by ISC (Internet Systems Consortium) for authoritative DNS servers and considered a very efficient mechanism to mitigate DNS amplification attacks. This mechanism allows authoritative servers using BIND 9.910 and above to partially avoid being part of amplification attacks.
RRL indicates that there should be a limit on identical or almost identical UDP responses that can be returned by a name server to the same IP address or even to a group of IP address, thus some responses should be discarded while others should be truncated. Additionally, when a legitimate response is blocked, the client will retry using either UDP or TCP.
In our experiments, we used the default parameters, slip = 2 and the default reply rate. The slip parameter serves to decide whether to truncate or to discard the answer, once the reply rate has been exceeded. Slip is very simple: if the number of replies is a multiple of slip, then the server truncates the answer, otherwise, it discards the answer. We simulated RRL using one-hour data log and the effects of enabling RRL can be appreciated in Fig. 4 , where we can clearly notice a reduction in traffic of about 15% which supports our previous finding of using a limit of 200 packets per second to discriminate legitimate traffic.
C. MAPPING DNS REQUEST-RESPONSE PACKETS
Another technique designed to mitigate DNS amplification attacks we decided to analyse is that of Kambourakis et al. [14] . The authors propose to map requests to responses, and as such, when under attack the victim is able to detect orphan packets (responses with no corresponding request) which in turn may be discarded and classified as suspicious. However, the main drawback of this technique is that it was designed to work on recursive DNS servers. Since we are working on Top-Level Domain (TLD) servers, they do not perform requests to other DNS servers, that is, there is no recursion. For this reason, the technique proposed by Kambourakis cannot be adapted properly; however, receiving orphan packets at this level may imply that the servers are being the target of a potential DDoS attack.
D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
When implementing the previous techniques, it is possible to discard packets by defining filters based on either null routes or iptables [20] - [25] . According to [21] , the decision of whether to implement null routes or iptables depends on which of the two techniques, once implemented in the target system, is more efficient. There is not a definitive answer to this since it depends on the number of routes in the routing table and the number of iptable rules. Hence, if the routing table is quite large, it is recommended to apply iptables rules; whereas the opposite holds: if an iptable rule is frequently used or there are too many rules, the best recommendation is to apply null routes.
After performing the previous analysis on known techniques, we reported the following recommendations. We propose the implementation at the TLD name servers of the following measures, aiming at mitigating potential DDoS attacks:
• Filter DNS Request packets coming from the same IP at a rate above n packets per second. For instance, in our scenario, we applied the rule setting n between 200 and 300 to filter a dozen of persistent IPs out of 200 thousand and to discard approximately 8.15% of traffic. The parameter n has to be fine-tuned in advance according to the traffic volume reaching the name server.
• Activate RRL on the DNS server (starting from BIND 9.910) as it is widely accepted by the IT management community. In our scenario, there is a 15% reduction in traffic that matches the RRL rules. RRL offers an efficient heuristic to discriminate legitimate from non-legitimate one.
• Look for and discard DNS orphan packets, and trigger an alert whenever a previously defined threshold is reached.
• Discard packets that reference domains in up to date black lists, following the recommendation in [22] - [25] .
V. THE DATA VISUALISATION MODEL
We present now the visualisation model which is one of the main components of the DNS-ADVP platform along with the classifier, which is described in detail in Section VI. Our aim is to design a visual model capable of describing the state of the traffic at the authoritative server and alerting whenever a given threshold is reached. The visual model consists of four graphs, referred to as type A to D. A graph type A offers a visualisation of IP activity, whereas a graph type B a visualisation of the proportion of IPs with a similar level of activity. A graph type C discloses the similarity of IP behaviour, and a graph type D shows how many of the IP behaviours are highly correlated. These graphs will be further described in the following sections. We must note that due to the amount of data received by the server, the visual model describes DNS traffic by using one-second windows.
A. TYPE A: IP ACTIVITY, BUBBLES GRAPH
This graph allows visualising IP activity, according to the number of requests performed to the name server. In Fig. 5 , each circle represents an IP /24 address prefix, either IPv4 or IPv6. The radio of the circle relates to the number of request packets. The colour of the circle reflects the number of total queries; dark tones represent few queries made whereas clearer tones mean a larger number of queries. So far, our observations indicate that the number of request packets is equal to the number of total queries. This visual model should change drastically in the case of an ongoing attack. This change will be perceived by the increment of one or more parameters from the graph, that is, the number, the size or the colour of the different circles in the graph. Fig. 5a shows a normal condition and Fig. 5b exposes a significant change under abnormal traffic.
Based on the work by López-Cuevas et al. [26] , we devised a configurable visual alert, acting like a three-colour semaphore. The semaphore alerts whenever a small number of IPs monopolises the traffic in the window. The semaphore acts according to three intervals limited by: LL A , lower limit and HL A , higher limit. These limits represent a percentage of the traffic in the window, and are defined for graphs type A.
Let AggT be the aggregated traffic sourced by a given number of IPs, nIP. AggT is expressed as a percentage of the total traffic in the window. The semaphore rules are (SO stands for semaphore output):
Thus, the DNS-ADVP platform allows for the configuration of the following parameters: nIP, LL A , and HL A ; the value of AggT is computed for the current window. 
B. TYPE B: IP ACTIVITY, TREE MAP
Type B graphs, also reflect IP activity, however, it is a complement to the previous type A graph. In this case, as depicted in Fig. 6 , the graph shows a number of clusters of different size and colour. The size of the cluster is proportional to the total number of IPs that perform a number of requests within the given ranges. The colour of the cluster provides an implicit visual alert, where green and blue denote normal to acceptable behaviour, whereas yellow and red may imply suspicious to abnormal behaviour. In the case of a DDoS attack, the size of the clusters will change, as can be noted in the same figure, when passing from a normal condition in Fig. 6a to an abnormal state in 6b. We defined these intervals based on the analysis performed in Section IV-A, which suggests that the number of requests performed by an IP should be limited to n. According to Table 1 therein, for n above 300 there should be, under normal conditions, very few persistent IPs; the opposite should hold.
C. TYPE C: CORRELATION MATRIX, HEAT MAP
The third graph of the visual component is a matrix of correlation values that gives us information about the similarity in the behaviour of a set of IPs in a given window. Similar behaviour in our context means that a given IP i has requested about the same domains as IP j . This basic idea has been taken from Alonso et al. [9] and it is summarised in the following paragraphs.
Let A be a m × n matrix, where m is the number of unique IPs and n the number of unique requested domains, D, in a window. The value of a ij ∈ A corresponds to the number of times IP i requested D j . The Gram matrix G as presented in [9] is given by A × A T , with the following properties:
• G is a symmetric matrix of order m, • G[i, j] represents the number of common domains queried by IP i and IP j , for i = j,
• The diagonal of the matrix represents IP i activity, that is, the number of queried domains performed by IP i . that goes from red for high correlation values to white for small ones.
During our experiments, we observed that normal DNS traffic is described by a few highly correlated IPs, and most of the N matrix filled with small correlation values. The number of cells in N with higher correlation should increase, given there is no domain randomisation, whenever a DDoS or botnet attack come to pass. Fig. 7a shows a normal state with few highly correlated values, whereas Fig. 7b spots too many IPs with very similar behaviour, very likely coming from a botnet spoofing a set of IPs and requesting for the same set of domains.
D. TYPE D: CORRELATION MATRIX, CHORDS DIAGRAM
Our fourth visual model is simply a nicer way to visualise the correlation matrix previously described, by means of a chord diagram, as shown in Fig. 8 . However, due to the amount of IP relationships, we only plot correlations that are above 0.9, otherwise, the graph would be meaningless; for example, using a window of t s with approximately n IPs, the complete chord graph would require about n(n − 1)/2 threads; in our case, t = 1 s and n ∼ 800. The colour of a thread is assigned when plotted, therefore, it has no special meaning. Fig. 8a shows the expected normal traffic condition; by contrast, in Fig. 8b , an abnormal condition is advert since too many IPs are highly correlated.
We defined a second configurable visual alert, implemented as a three-colour semaphore. The semaphore alerts whenever the percentage of correlations above 0.9 surpasses a certain threshold. The semaphore acts according to three intervals limited by: LL D , lower limit and HL D , higher limit. These limits represent a percentage of the traffic in the window, and are defined for graphs type D. Let HCor be the percentage of highly correlation values in the window. The semaphore rules are: (2) Thus, the DNS-ADVP platform allows for the configuration of the following parameters: LL D , and HL D ; the value of HCor is computed for the current window.
VI. THE MACHINE LEARNING ALGORITHM
We describe now the second component of the DNS-ADVP platform, a machine learning module responsible for analysing DNS traffic and finding patterns that deviate from normal behaviour. It supports the visual component described previously in Section V, by means of a one-class K-NN classifier. The output of the classifier is displayed as a two-colour semaphore, showing green for normal traffic and red for an abnormal one.
The input of the classifier is a feature vector computed from a one-second window of DNS traffic. This feature vector has been carefully designed to extract essential properties from traffic that allow for a clear characterisation of traffic behaviour. The basic feature vector comprises 45 attributes; additionally, we added to the feature vector the speed of change for every attribute (except day and time). This change in time is calculated with respect to the previous second, the previous minute and the previous hour. Hence, the final feature vector includes 174 attributes (45 + (43 × 3) ). Before describing in detail the classifier, we present in the next section the final attributes.
A. THE FEATURE VECTOR
We present now the attributes that make the structure of the feature vector; we expect that, depending on the kind of attack, the attributes values will experiment a drastic change.
According to [9] , the underlying social structures of the DNS and their changes can reflect the existence of attacks on DNS servers. There, the authors propose a feature vector consisting of more than 20 attributes. However, computing some of their attributes is cost and time prohibitive for a platform that is meant to monitor real-time traffic, such as DNS-ADVP. They reported an asymptotic complexity of O(n 4 ) to compute the feature vector. Taking this into account, we preserved only the first 12 attributes from [9] shown in Table 2 , leaving out, due to their complexity, the features derived from the image segmentation heuristic described therein. We added Source Port Entropy to the list of attributes. For a detail description of these attributes, the interested reader is referred to [9] . Based on our work, we added 32 attributes, described in Table 3 to conform the final feature vector. To compute all attributes, our maximum complexity is O(n 3 ), found on the matrix multiplication, an operation that can be accelerated using GPU (graphics processing unit) processors.
B. THE CLASSIFIER
Detecting DDoS attacks in DNS traffic is a one-class classification problem because there are not samples of every type of possible attack for training a multi-class classifier. The DNS traffic changes over time. This leads us to the hypothesis that normal DNS traffic, in a specific moment in time, must follow the same patterns than those from the traffic in the past ''nearest time'' and from the traffic in the future nearest time. If we confirm this hypothesis, then building traditional one-class classifiers [27] - [29] would be unfeasible because these classifiers train with objects collected in a specific period. They may assume that the system under protection does not change over time so any variation, even normal, would be classified as an attack.
In order to prove our hypothesis, we carried out a simple experiment. We performed a 10-fold cross-validation experiment with the training dataset taking the hour, from the Timestamp feature, as the target class. Using this approach, the classifier attained only a 26% of accuracy. Now, let us assume that, instead of forming a bijection from classes and activity hours, a class now corresponds to a fixed hour, and includes the activity corresponding to six additional hours: three consecutive hours before, and those after the hour designating the class. Note that, in particular, classes here overlap, and so we depart from standard classification. Then, when we train the same classifier using this new class composition, the accuracy of classification increases to 78%. Fig. 9 shows the confusion matrix of the second experiment, computed with K-NN. Note that the ideal confusion matrix, the one representing a classifier with 100% of accuracy, has a red diagonal while the rest of the cells are green. The confusion matrix reveals that many objects are correctly classified since most of the orange and red cells are close to the main diagonal. This led us to confirm our hypothesis while quantifying ''nearest time'' as three hours. We choose K = 60 for our K-NN, since it achieved the best result after an exhaustive search. Table 4 shows a summary of the K-NN efficiency obtained for different values of K . From our hypothesis, we infer that a ''good'' classifier for detecting DDoS attacks must update its knowledge base with the most recent data from DNS traffic while discarding the oldest information. This motivates us to design a classifier based on K-NN because it updates with O(1) time complexity for every new object to include in the training dataset.
We propose a variant of the K-NN classifier, named DDoSKNN (see Algorithm 1) , that uses the hour of the day as the class of each new vector which is classified in the majority hour of the 60 nearest data-points of the training dataset. If the new vector is deemed to be similar to previous data of the same hour or to data within the last three hours, then the new vector is labelled as normal DNS behaviour and it is added to the training dataset of DDoSKNN. Otherwise, the data point is deemed DDoS attack and it is not included in the training database. Whenever we include a new vector into the training database, we discard the oldest vector ensuring that the training dataset is always up-to-date with the last 24 hours of the DNS behaviour. In essence, the rationale behind our classifier is that, in normal conditions, the behaviour of the DNS traffic at the current time must be similar to the previously seen behaviour at the same hour or the past three hours.
C. TRAINING AND TESTING THE CLASSIFIER
To validate DDoSKNN, our proposed classifier shown in Algorithm 1, we trained and tested the classifier using a 48-hour data log divided into two blocks of 24 hours each; we use the first and second blocks for training and testing, respectively. For testing purposes, we derived synthetic attacks by modifying the values in a feature vector. After calculating the attributes as described in Section VI-A, we randomly increase or decrease, slightly, their values in order to create similar, but probably unseen feature vectors. Compare v with every vector in T using Euclidean distance avoiding the Timestamp feature. 3: Compute the majority class of the nearest 60 vectors (the class of every vector is its own hour). 4: 5: if The vector v is classified in its current hour or in one of the last three hours. then 6: Label v as normal DNS behaviour.
7:
Include v in T . 8: Remove the oldest vector v in T .
9:
else 10: Label v as abnormal.
11:
Return the label assigned to v.
After training, we tested DDoSKNN using two data logs to create two different scenarios. The first data log was obtained by merging the original testing block with 12 hours of synthetic attacks, which were randomly scattered into the 24-hour block, with substitution. The second testing data log was created similarly, but in this case, the attacks were inserted using blocks of one hour containing such attacks; that is, alternating one hour of normal traffic with one hour of synthetic attacks. Using these scenarios, DDoS-KNN achieved an 83% of AUC, which is a very encouraging classifier performance.
We used synthetic attacks in our experiments due to the unavailability of real DNS attacks on the authoritative DNS servers under study. Even if we had access to such attacks from public datasets, we would have required to adapt them in order to be used in conjunction with our data logs, making the final testing dataset, a synthetic one. In addition, it is worth to note that we searched into the DNS-OARC site (Domain Name System Operations Analysis and Research Center), for logs containing DNS attacks according to our needs, without success.
In [30] , the authors propose a metric, called R for realism, based on a fuzzy logic system to evaluate the quality of the realism of public datasets used to design intrusion detection systems. Let us call this sort of datasets, IDS datasets. The main reason to perform this assessment is that they agree upon the difficulty to collect data from real-world enterprise networks due to business operation and confidentiality issues. Hence, several public IDS datasets are built from synthetic traffic and synthetic attacks with probably limited real-network traffic. Thus, having an R metric to measure the quality of an IDS dataset is very significant, in order to validate the performance of the intrusion detection system that is being proposed. Fortunately, in our case, we were able to gather data from production traffic as stated in Section I. Besides, we consider that our dataset is not a generalised IDS dataset but a DNS-specific dataset that can help the community to develop novel techniques to protect critical infrastructure, as is the case of authoritative DNS servers. For the interested reader, our training and testing datasets are available upon request to the corresponding author.
VII. INTEGRATION OF THE VISUAL MODEL AND THE CLASSIFIER
Our goal is to develop a platform that is able to alert when patterns in the traffic reaching a TLD name server changes abnormally; in this way, the system is capable to timely detect and mitigate DDoS attacks, for instance, an amplification attack. To achieve such a system, we integrated the visual model introduced in Section V together with the machine learning algorithm described in Section VI. DNS-ADVP is the result of this integration, whose architecture is described in the following paragraphs.
As shown in Fig. 10 , the DNS-ADVP platform consists of four modules: physical interface, data pre-processing, visualisation, and classification modules. The physical interface captures traffic from the cable and creates binary pcap files of one second that serve as input to the data pre-processing module, in charge of transforming the stream of bits into a more structured text file for further processing, as described in Section III. Next, the new file is the feedback to two simultaneous processes: the classification module and the visualisation module.
The classification module prepares the feature vector (see Tables 2 and 3 ) that serves as input to the classifier, which is currently implemented by an adaptation of a K-NN classifier, as described in Section VI-B. After an initial training period, the classifier starts receiving objects, that is, a feature vector computed from a one-second window of traffic, and classifies the object as normal or abnormal. The result of the classification is displayed on the visual platform using a semaphore.
The visualisation module computes all numerical parameters, such as the correlation matrix, required to display in the platform the four types of graphs introduced in Section V. Visual alerts are displayed along the graphs using two semaphores that signal for normal, suspicious or abnormal traffic, according to (1) and (2) .
The platform can run several instances, one for each TLD server to be monitored. Individual parameters can be set-up for each instance, according to the volume of traffic reaching the name server. The platform refreshes the visualisations every 5 seconds. The latency of the visual platform, since a pcap file is received, until the data is transformed and displayed in the platform is about 20 seconds, on a computer with 32 GB RAM, an Intel core i7 processor at 2.9 -3.9 GHz (4 dual-cores). The DNS-ADVP platform is provided with an audible alert and an error logging process whenever the platform determines an abnormal condition is attained. The platform sends an e-mail to a set of recipients previously defined, to alert managers of the current situation.
The audible alert and logging process follow the next protocol based on the three semaphores embedded in the platform; these semaphores are the possible sources of an alert: If at least one source turns red, the window is tagged as red, otherwise it is labelled green. If three consecutive windows are tagged as red, then the information in the windows is logged into an error system file and the logging process continues until a green window is received. If six consecutive windows are labelled red, an audible alert is triggered and the e-mails sent. Logging stops, and the alert protocol resets, whenever a green window is seen. This protocol is a trade-off between timely detection and false alerts signalled by the platform's components.
The final integration of all components and the on-line operation of the DNS-ADVP platform can be observed in Fig. 11 . For the interested reader, the following link shows a pre-recorded video of the real platform running on-line and remotely monitoring a TLD name server (https: //youtu.be/ZpJ0HODxkIc). Synthesised attacks were inserted at approximately minute 1 of the video, in order to appreciate the audible alert, and the error logging process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have developed DNS-ADVP, an integrated platform that aims to timely detect, and then mitigate, an ongoing DNS DDoS attack. DNS-ADVP provides a visual model to interpret the current state of the traffic in an authoritative DNS server, and contains a one-class classifier that VOLUME 7, 2019 draws attention whenever the DNS server shows abnormal behaviour. To accomplish this task, we have carried out an in-depth of well-known techniques that mitigate DNS DDoS attacks, namely: a UDP rule to limit the rate of requests done by the same IP [20] , the well-known RRL (Response Rate Limit) [11] , and the technique proposed by Kambourakis et al. [14] ; we have determined how relevant and how suitable these techniques are for being adopted in a production environment. To build DNS-ADVP, we have proposed a novel visual model to rapidly interpret current DNS traffic and to timely point out any anomalies using visual semaphores. Along this, we have developed a new classifier based on K-NN, especially designed towards evolving according to the dynamic nature of an authoritative DNS server traffic; in our experiments, our classifier achieved an 83% of AUC, when tested on synthetic attacks. Our classifier works with a rich feature space, computable in reasonable time. This research has been conducted in collaboration with NIC-Mexico, in charge of the Top-Level Domain (TLD) Name Servers for.MX.
Ongoing research is concerned with reducing the latency of the system; we intend to employ GPUs to accelerate numerical computations, and to take advantage of the inherent parallelism in some modules of the platform. We currently are exploring on how to enhance the visual model with user interaction, and by this means provide further insights, such as source IP, client profile, geographic locations, among others.
